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The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 1989 40(3):365-367; doi:10.1093/bjps/40.3.365
© 1989 by British Society for the Philosophy of Science
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An Anomaly in the D–N Model of Explanation

ALEX BLUM

Bar-Ilan University 52100 Ramat-Gan Israel

It is argued that the constraints placed on the non-law premisses of a D–N explanation are irrelevant to their function and will not salvage the deductive requirement from triviality.


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