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The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 1990 41(3):333-350; doi:10.1093/bjps/41.3.333
© 1990 by British Society for the Philosophy of Science
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Articles

The Epistemology of J. M. Keynes1

ROD O'DONNELL

Macquarie University Sydney

This paper has two objectives, neither previously attempted in the published literature—first, to outline J. M. Keynes's theory of knowledge in some detail, and, secondly, to justify the contention that his epistemology is a variety of rationalism, and not, as many have asserted, a form of empiricism. Keynes's attitude to empirical data is also analysed as well as his views on prediction and theory choice.


1This paper is partly based on ideas initially advanced in O'Donnell [1982], a revised and expanded version of which is to be published as O'Donnell [1989]. I should like to thank an anonymous referee for helpful comment, and King's College, Cambridge for permission to quote from the Keynes Papers.


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