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The Inapplicability of Evolutionarily Stable Strategy to the Prisoner's Dilemma
Edelstein Centre for the History and Philosophy of Science, Technology and Medicine, Hebrew University of Jerusalem
The AxelrodHamilton games-theoretic conflict model, which applies Maynard Smith's concept of evolutionarily stable strategy to the Prisoner's Dilemma, gives rise to an inconsistency between theoretical prescription and empirical results. Proposed resolutions of thisproblem are incongruent with the tenets of the models involved. The independent consistency of each model is restored, and the anomaly thereby circumvented, by a proof that no evolutionarily stable strategy exists in the Prisoner's Dilemma.
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