Skip Navigation

The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 1993 44(1):151-156; doi:10.1093/bjps/44.1.151
© 1993 by British Society for the Philosophy of Science
This Article
Right arrow Full Text (PDF)
Right arrow Alert me when this article is cited
Right arrow Alert me if a correction is posted
Services
Right arrow Email this article to a friend
Right arrow Similar articles in this journal
Right arrow Alert me to new issues of the journal
Right arrow Add to My Personal Archive
Right arrow Download to citation manager
Right arrowRequest Permissions
Google Scholar
Right arrow Articles by KEITA, L.
Right arrow Search for Related Content
Social Bookmarking
 Add to CiteULike   Add to Connotea   Add to Del.icio.us  
What's this?


Discussions

Jennings and Zande Logic: A Note

LANSANA KEITA

Hyattsville Maryland USA

In ‘Zande Logic and Western Logic’ Richard Jennings argues that contrary to the view of Evans-Pritchard and Tim Triplett the system of logic employed by the Azande is sui generis and distinct from that of Westerners. I argue that this thesis is erroneous because Jennings, following Evans-Pritchard, is at fault in his analysis of the logic of the Azande. Zande thinking on the topic of witchcraft-substance heritability is not contradictory as believed. But even if one assumes that the Azande do reason contradictorily on matters of institutional importance, Jennings' thesis on the possibility of incompatible logics still fails because similar instances of contradictory thinking could be found in the West. Although in practical matters all peoples appeal to orthodox logic, in matters of institutional importance the epistemological relativist could be on fertile ground where orthodox logic is in conflict with beliefs that are institutionally grounded.


Add to CiteULike CiteULike   Add to Connotea Connotea   Add to Del.icio.us Del.icio.us    What's this?


This article has been cited by other articles:


Home page
Philosophy of the Social SciencesHome page
B. Dov Lerner
Winch and Instrumental Pluralism: A Response to My Critics
Philosophy of the Social Sciences, June 1, 1998; 28(2): 312 - 320.
[PDF]


Home page
Philosophy of the Social SciencesHome page
P. Slezak
A Second Look at David Bloor's: Knowledge and Social Imagery
Philosophy of the Social Sciences, September 1, 1994; 24(3): 336 - 361.
[Abstract] [PDF]



Disclaimer: Please note that abstracts for content published before 1996 were created through digital scanning and may therefore not exactly replicate the text of the original print issues. All efforts have been made to ensure accuracy, but the Publisher will not be held responsible for any remaining inaccuracies. If you require any further clarification, please contact our Customer Services Department.