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The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 1994 45(2):437-450; doi:10.1093/bjps/45.2.437
© 1994 by British Society for the Philosophy of Science
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The Virtues of Randomization

DAVID PAPINEAU

Peter Urbach has argued, on Bayesian grounds, that experimental randomization serves no useful purpose in testing causal hypothesis. I maintain that he fails to distinguish general issues of statistical inference from specific problems involved in identifying causes. I concede the general Bayesian thesis that random sampling is inessential to sound statistical inference. But experimental randomization is a different matter, and often plays an essential role in our route to causal conclusions.


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J. Worrall
Why There's No Cause to Randomize
Brit J Philos Sci, September 1, 2007; 58(3): 451 - 488.
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