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The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 1994 45(2):549-554; doi:10.1093/bjps/45.2.549
© 1994 by British Society for the Philosophy of Science
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Abstract Complexity Theory and the Mind-Machine Problem

ALBERT E. LYNGZEIDETSON1 and MARTIN K. SOLOMON2

Department of Philosophy, Florida Atlantic University Davie Florida, USA
Department of Computer Science and Engineering, Florida Atlantic University Boca Raton, Florida, USA

In this paper we interpret a characterization of the Gödel speed-up phenomenon as providing support for the ‘Nagel-Newman thesis’ that human theorem recognizers differ from mechanical theorem recognizers in that the former do not seem to be limited by Gödel's incompleteness theorems whereas the latter do seem to be thus limited.

However, we also maintain that (currently non-existent) programs which are open systems in that they continuously interact with, and are thus inseparable from, their environment, are not covered by the above (or probably any other recursion-theoretic) argument.


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