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The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 1994 45(2):716-742; doi:10.1093/bjps/45.2.716
© 1994 by British Society for the Philosophy of Science
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William Whewell: Problems of Induction vs. Problems of Rationality

JOHN WETTERSTEN

Universitat Mannheim

The question whether attempts to vindicate induction should be abandoned in favor of (other) problems of rationality is pressing and difficult. How may we decide rationally when standards for rationality are at issue? It may be useful to first know how we have decided in the past. Whewell's philosophy of science and the reaction to it are discussed. Whewell's contemporaries mistakenly thought that only an inductivist research program could produce an adequate theory of rationality. But this very move violated their own standards of rationality. We should now avoid making the same mistake again. We should return to Whewell's rejected proposal to make the philosophy of science historical and seek thereby to improve rational practice.


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