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The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 1995 46(2):197-218; doi:10.1093/bjps/46.2.197
© 1995 by British Society for the Philosophy of Science
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Is There Really No Projection Postulate in the Modal Interpretation?

W.Michael Dickson

Department of Philosophy, University of South Carolina Columbia, SC 29208, USA

Modal interpretations of quantum mechanics admit two kinds of state: physical states, which specify the values of observables on a system, and theoretical states, which specify a probability distribution over possible physical states. They appear to use this distinction to deny the projection postulate, claiming that collapse corresponds only to a change from discussing the theoretical state to discussing the physical state. I argue that modal interpretations should adopt a projection postulate at the level of the theoretical state. However, other features of modal interpretations might render the projection postulate immune from the usual objections.


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