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Carnap and Kuhn: Arch Enemies or Close Allies?
Philosophy Department, Bo\#487;aziçi University 80815 Bebek, Istanbul, Turkey
Philosophy Department, Middle East Technical University 06531 Ankara, Turkey
We compare Carnap's and Kuhn's views on science. Although there are important differences between them, the similarities are striking. The basis for the latter is a pragmatically oriented semantic conventionalist picture of science, which suggests that the view that post-positivist philosophy of science constitutes a radical revolution which has no interesting affinities with logical positivism must be seriously mistaken.
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