© 1995 by British Society for the Philosophy of Science
Discussions |
How Not to Change the Theory of Theory Change: A Reply to Tennant
Department of Philosophy, Uppsala University Villavägen 5, 752 36 Uppsula, Sweden
Department of Philosophy, University of Konstanz P. O. Box 5560, 78434 Konstanz, Germany
A number of seminal papers on the logic of belief change by Alchourrön, Gärden-fors, and Makinson have given rise to what is now known as the AGM paradigm. The present discussion note is a response to Neil Tennant's [1994], which aims at a critical appraisal of the AGM approach and the introduction of an alternative approach. We show that important parts of Tennants's critical remarks are based on misunderstandings or on lack of information. In the course of doing this, we attend to some central philosophical issues in the theory of belief change, such as the choice of a representation for belief states and the meaning of an idealized rational agent.