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The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 1998 49(3):387-395; doi:10.1093/bjps/49.3.387
© 1998 by British Society for the Philosophy of Science
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Articles

A Consistent Restriction of the Principle of Indifference

Paul Castell

Wolfson College Oxford OX2 6UD, UK

I argue that a particular restricted version of the Principle of Indiference is a consistent, indispensible tool for guiding our probabilistic judgements.


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