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The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 1999 50(3):401-416; doi:10.1093/bjps/50.3.401
© 1999 by British Society for the Philosophy of Science
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Countable additivity and subjective probability

J Williamson

Philosophy Department, King's College, Strand, London WC2R 2LS, UK. E-mail: jon.williamson@kcl.ac.uk

While there are several arguments on either side, it is far from clear as to whether or not countable additivity is an acceptable axiom of subjective probability. I focus here on de Finetti's central argument against countable additivity and provide a new Dutch book proof of the principle, To argue that if we accept the Dutch book foundations of subjective probability, countable additivity is an unavoidable constraint.


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