© 1999 by British Society for the Philosophy of Science
| ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
Independence, invariance and the causal Markov condition
A Department of Philosophy, University of Wisconsin-Madison, Madison, WI 53706, USA E-mail: dhausman@facstaff.wisc.edu Division of Humanities and Social Sciences, California Institute of Technology, Pasadena, CA 91125, USA E-mail: jfw@hss.caltech.edu
This essay explains what the Causal Markov Condition says and defends the condition from the many criticisms that have been launched against it. Although we are skeptical about some of the applications of the Causal Markov Condition, we argue that it is implicit in the view that causes can be used to manipulate their effects and that it cannot be surrendered without surrendering this view of causation.
![]()
CiteULike
Connotea
Del.icio.us What's this?
This article has been cited by other articles:
![]() |
D. Steel Methodological Individualism, Explanation, and Invariance Philosophy of the Social Sciences, December 1, 2006; 36(4): 440 - 463. [Abstract] [PDF] |
||||
![]() |
N. Cartwright From Metaphysics to Method: Comments on Manipulability and the Causal Markov Condition Brit J Philos Sci, March 1, 2006; 57(1): 197 - 218. [Abstract] [Full Text] [PDF] |
||||
![]() |
D. Steel Comment On Hausman & Woodward On The Causal Markov Condition Brit J Philos Sci, March 1, 2006; 57(1): 219 - 231. [Abstract] [Full Text] [PDF] |
||||
![]() |
J.-F. Jacques and E. Picavet Mesure des Associations Phenomenales et Causalite en Macro-Econometrie Social Science Information, December 1, 2003; 42(4): 591 - 624. [Abstract] [PDF] |
||||


