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The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 1999 50(4):585-612; doi:10.1093/bjps/50.4.585
© 1999 by British Society for the Philosophy of Science
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Contrastive explanation and the demons of determinism

C Hitchcock

Division of Humanities and Social Sciences 101-40, California Institute of Technology, Pasadena, CA 91125, USA E-mail: cricky@caltech.edu

It it tempting to think that if an outcome had some probability of not occurring, then we cannot explain why that outcome in fact occurred. Despite this intuition, most philosophers of science have come to admit the possibility of indeterministic explanation. Yet some of them continue to hold that if an outcome was not determined, it cannot be explained why that outcome rather than some other occurred. I argue that this is an untenable compromise: if indeterministic explanation is possible, then indeterministic contrastive explanation is possible too. In order to defend this conclusion, I develop an account of contrastive explanation.


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J. Chandler
Solving the Tacking Problem with Contrast Classes
Brit J Philos Sci, September 1, 2007; 58(3): 489 - 502.
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