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The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 2000 51(4):685-704; doi:10.1093/bjps/51.4.685
© 2000 by British Society for the Philosophy of Science
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Saving epistemology from the epistemologists: recent work in the theory of knowledge

A Morton

This is a very selective survey of developments in epistemology, concentrating on work from the past twenty years that is of interest to philosophers of science. The selection is organized around interesting connections between distinct themes. I first connect issues about skepticism to issues about the reliability of belief-acquiring processes. Next I connect discussions of the defeasibility of reasons for belief to accounts of the theory-independence of evidence. Then I connect doubts about Bayesian epistemology to issues about the content of perception. The last detailed connection is between considerations of the finiteness of cognition and epistemic virtues. To connect the connections I end by briefly discussing the pressure that consideration of social roles in the transmission of belief puts on the purpose of epistemology.


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