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The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 2001 52(2):331-346; doi:10.1093/bjps/52.2.331
© 2001 by British Society for the Philosophy of Science
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Venetian Sea Levels, British Bread Prices, and the Principle of the Common Cause

Elliott Sober1,2

1 Department of Philosophy, University of Wiscinsin, Madison, WI 53706, USA. ersober@facstaff.wisc.edu 2 Department of Philosophy, Logic, and Scientific Method, London School of Economics and Political Science, Houghton Street, London WC2A 2AE, UK

When two causally independent processes each have a quantity that increases monotonically (either deterministically or in probabilistic expectation), the two quantities will be correlated, thus providing a counterexample to Reichenbach's principle of the common cause. Several philosophers have denied this, but I argue that their efforts to save the principle are unsuccessful. Still, one salvage attempt does suggest a weaker principle that avoids the initial counterexample. However, even this weakened principle is mistaken, as can be seen by exploring the concepts of homology and homoplasy used in evolutionary biology. I argue that the kernel of truth in the principle of the common cause is to be found by separating metaphysical and epistemological issues; as far as the epistemology is concerned, the Likelihood Principle is central.


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