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The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 2001 52(3):515-537; doi:10.1093/bjps/52.3.515
© 2001 by British Society for the Philosophy of Science
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The Bayesian Treatment of Auxiliary Hypotheses

Michael Strevens1

1 Stanford University, Department of Philosophy, Stanford, CA 94305-2155, USA. strevens@stanford.edu

This paper examines the standard Bayesian solution to the Quine–Duhem problem, the problem of distributing blame between a theory and its auxiliary hypotheses in the aftermath of a failed prediction. The standard solution, I argue, begs the question against those who claim that the problem has no solution. I then provide an alternative Bayesian solution that is not question-begging and that turns out to have some interesting and desirable properties not possessed by the standard solution. This solution opens the way to a satisfying treatment of a problem concerning ad hoc auxiliary hypotheses.


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This article has been cited by other articles:


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B. Fitelson and A. Waterman
Comparative Bayesian Confirmation and the Quine-Duhem Problem: A Rejoinder to Strevens
Brit J Philos Sci, June 1, 2007; 58(2): 333 - 338.
[Abstract] [Full Text] [PDF]

Home page
 Br J Philos SciHome page
M. Strevens
The Bayesian Treatment of Auxiliary Hypotheses: Reply to Fitelson and Waterman
Brit J Philos Sci, December 1, 2005; 56(4): 913 - 918.
[Abstract] [Full Text] [PDF]


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