© 2001 by British Society for the Philosophy of Science
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The Apparent Superiority of Prediction to Accommodation as a Side Effect: a Reply to Maher
1 Department of Philosophy, University of Washington (Seattle), Box 353350, Seattle, WA 981953350, USA. mlange@u.washington.edu
Maher ([1990], [1993]) has offered a lovely example to motivate the intuition that a successful prediction has a kind of confirmatory significance that an accommodation lacks. This paper scrutinizes Maher's example. It argues that once the example is tweaked, the intuitive difference there between prediction and accommodation disappears. This suggests that the apparent superiority of prediction to accommodation is actually a side effect of an important difference between the hypotheses that tend to arise in each case.
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