© 2001 by British Society for the Philosophy of Science
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Defensible Territory for Entity Realism
1 ARC Commonwealth Special Research Centre for Applied Philosophy and Public Ethics, Charles Sturt University, LPO Box A260, Canberra ACT 2601, Australia. stevemonad{at}hotmail.com
In the face of argument to the contrary, it is shown that there is defensible middle ground available for entity realism, between the extremes of scientific realism and empiricist antirealism. Cartwright's ([1983]) earlier argument for defensible middle ground between these extremes, which depended crucially on the viability of an underdeveloped distinction between inference to the best explanation (IBE) and inference to the most probable cause (IPC), is examined and its defects are identified. The relationship between IBE and IPC is clarified and a revised version of Cartwright's argument for defensible middle ground, which is free of the identified defects, is presented.
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