© 2002 by British Society for the Philosophy of Science
What Perception Is Doing, and What it Is Not Doing, in Mathematical Reasoning
1 Charlottetown, Prince Edward Island, Canada. DenLom8{at}aol.com
What is perception doing in mathematical reasoning? To address this question, I discuss the role of perception in geometric reasoning. Perception of the shape properties of concrete diagrams provides, I argue, a surrogate consciousness of the shape properties of the abstract geometric objects depicted in the diagrams. Some of what perception is not doing in mathematical reasoning is also discussed. I take issue with both Parsons and Maddy. Parsons claims that we perceive a certain type of abstract object. Maddy claims (at least at one time claimed) that perception provides the basis for intuition of mathematical sets.
1 Mathematical reasoning with diagrams
2 Do we perceive abstract objects?
3 Do we perceive mathematical sets?