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The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 2002 53(3):391-410; doi:10.1093/bjps/53.3.391
© 2002 by British Society for the Philosophy of Science
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A New Solution to the Paradoxes of Rational Acceptability

Igor Douven1

1 Department of Philosophy, Erasmus University Rotterdam, P.O. Box 1738, 3000 DR Rotterdam, The Netherlands. douven{at}fwb.eur.nl

The Lottery Paradox and the Preface Paradox both involve the thesis that high probability is sufficient for rational acceptability. The standard solution to these paradoxes denies that rational acceptability is deductively closed. This solution has a number of untoward consequences. The present paper suggests that a better solution to the paradoxes is to replace the thesis that high probability suffices for rational acceptability with a somewhat stricter thesis. This avoids the untoward consequences of the standard solution. The new solution will be defended against a seemingly obvious objection.

1 The paradoxes of rational acceptability

2 The standard solution

3 A new solution to the paradoxes

4 Basic assumptions

5 The new solution defended

6 Conclusion

7 Appendix


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