© 2002 by British Society for the Philosophy of Science
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The Search Hypothesis of Emotion
1 Biomimetics Group, Department of Mechanical Engineering, University of Bath, Bath BA2 7AY, UK. d.evans{at}bath.ac.uk
Many philosophers and psychologists now argue that emotions play a vital role in reasoning. This paper explores one particular way of elucidating how emotions help reason which may be dubbed ‘the search hypothesis of emotion’. After outlining the search hypothesis of emotion and dispensing with a red herring that has marred previous statements of the hypothesis, I discuss two alternative readings of the search hypothesis. It is argued that the search hypothesis must be construed as an account of what emotions typically do, rather than as a definition of emotion. Even as an account of what emotions typically do, the search hypothesis can only be evaluated in the context of a specific theory of what emotions are.
1 Introduction
2 The search hypothesis of emotion
3 A red herring: the frame problem
4 The search problem
5 Two readings of the search hypothesis
6 Two final remarks
7 Conclusion
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