© 2003 by British Society for the Philosophy of Science
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Hypercomputation and the Physical Church-Turing Thesis
1 via Corsica 301, I25125 Brescia, Italy. pc-logic{at}cydon.com
A version of the Church-Turing Thesis states that every effectively realizable physical system can be defined by Turing Machines (Thesis P); in this formulation the Thesis appears an empirical, more than a logico-mathematical, proposition. We review the main approaches to computation beyond Turing definability (hypercomputation): supertask, non-well-founded, analog, quantum, and retrocausal computation. These models depend on infinite computation, explicitly or implicitly, and appear physically implausible; moreover, even if infinite computation were realizable, the Halting Problem would not be affected. Therefore, Thesis P is not essentially different from the standard Church-Turing Thesis.
1 Introduction
2 Computability and incomputability
3 The physical interpretation of the Church-Turing Thesis
4 Supertasks and infinite computation
5 Computation on non-well-founded domains
6 Analog computation
7 Quantum computation
8 Retrocausal computation
9 Conclusions
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