© 2003 by British Society for the Philosophy of Science
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Critical Notice |
Presentism and Relativity
1 Department of Philosophy, University of Georgia 2 Program in History of Science and Technology, University of Minnesota
In this critical notice we argue against William Craig's recent attempt to reconcile presentism (roughly, the view that only the present is real) with relativity theory. Craig's defense of his position boils down to endorsing a neo-Lorentzian interpretation of special relativity. We contend that his reconstruction of Lorentz's theory and its historical development is fatally flawed and that his arguments for reviving this theory fail on many counts.
1 Rival theories of time
2 Relativity and the present
3 Special relativity: one theory, three interpretations
4 Theories of principle and constructive theories
5 The relativity interpretation: explanatorily deficient?
6 The relativity interpretation: ontologically fragmented?
7 The space-time interpretation: does God need a preferred frame of reference?
8 The neo-Lorentzian interpretation: at what price?
9 The neo-Lorentzian interpretation: with what payoff?
10 Why we should prefer the space-time interpretation over the neo-Lorentzian interpretation
11 What about general relativity?
12 Squaring the tenseless space-time interpretation with our tensed experience
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