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The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 2003 54(3):465-474; doi:10.1093/bjps/54.3.465
© 2003 by British Society for the Philosophy of Science
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Success, Truth and the Galilean Strategy

P. D. Magnus1

1 Department of Philosophy, University of California, San Diego, 9500 Gilman Drive, La Jolla, CA, USA 92093-0119. pmagnus{at}fecundity.com

Philip Kitcher develops the Galilean Strategy to defend realism against its many opponents. I explore the structure of the Galilean Strategy and consider it specifically as an instrument against constructive empiricism. Kitcher claims that the Galilean Strategy underwrites an inference from success to truth. We should resist that conclusion, I argue, but the Galilean Strategy should lead us by other routes to believe in many things about which the empiricist would rather remain agnostic.

1 Target: empiricism

2 The Galilean Strategy

3 Strengthening the argument

4 Success and truth

5 Conclusion


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