© 2004 by British Society for the Philosophy of Science
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The Place of Time in Cognition
Department of Philosophy, University of South Florida, 4202 E. Fowler Ave., FAO 226, Tampa, FL 33620, weiskopfeluna.cas.usf.edu
Dynamical systems theorists (dynamicists) allege that symbolic models of cognition are essentially incomplete because they fail to capture the temporal properties of mental processing. I present two possible interpretations of the dynamicists' argument from time and show that neither one is successful. The disagreement between dynamicists and symbolic theorists rests not on temporal considerations per se, but on differences over the multiple realizability of cognitive states and the proper explanatory goals of psychology. The negative arguments of dynamicists against symbolic models fail, and it is doubtful whether pursuing dynamicists' explanatory goals will lead to a robust psychological theory.
- Introduction
- Elements of the symbolic theory
- Elements of dynamical systems theory
- The argument from time
- 4.1 First interpretation of the argument from time
- 4.2 Second interpretation of the argument from time
- 4.2 Second interpretation of the argument from time
- 4.1 First interpretation of the argument from time
- Limits of dynamical systems theory