© 2004 by British Society for the Philosophy of Science
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Measures, Explanations and the Past: Should Special Initial Conditions be Explained?
Department of Philosophy, University of California, San Diego, La Jolla, CA 92093, U.S.A.
For the generalizations of thermodynamics to obtain, it appears that a very special initial condition of the universe is required. Is this initial condition itself in need of explanation? I argue that it is not. In so doing, I offer a framework in which to think about special initial conditions in all areas of science, though I concentrate on the case of thermodynamics. I urge the view that it is not always a serious mark against a theory that it must posit an improbable initial condition.
- Introduction
- Price's objection
- What we want explained
- A range of unlikely initial conditions
- Brute facts and explanation
- The best-system analysis
- Explaining the past state
- Conclusion
- Appendix
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