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The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 2004 55(4):667-680; doi:10.1093/bjps/55.4.667
© 2004 by British Society for the Philosophy of Science
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Some Considerations on Conditional Chances

Paul Humphreys

Corcoran Department of Philosophy, 512 Cabell Hall, University of Virginia, Charlottesville, Virginia 22904-4780, USA pwh2a{at}virginia.edu

Four interpretations of single-case conditional propensities are described and it is shown that for each a version of what has been called ‘Humphreys' Paradox’ remains, despite the clarifying work of Gillies, McCurdy and Miller. This entails that propensities cannot be a satisfactory interpretation of standard probability theory.

  1. Introduction
  2. The basic issue
  3. The formal paradox
  4. Values of conditional propensities
  5. Interpretations of propensities
  6. McCurdy's response
  7. Miller's response
  8. Other possibilities
    8.1 Temporal evolution
    8.2 Renormalization
    8.3 Causal influence

  9. Propensities to generate frequencies
  10. Conclusion


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