© 2004 by British Society for the Philosophy of Science
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Constructive Empiricism and Modal Metaphysics: A Reply to Monton and van Fraassen
Department of Philosophy, University of Bristol, 9 Woodland Road, Bristol BS8 1TB, UK
In this journal [2000], I argued that Bas van Fraassen's constructive empiricism was undermined in various ways by his antirealism about modality. Here I offer some comments and responses to the reply to my arguments by Bradley Monton and van Fraassen [2003]. In particular, after making some minor points, I argue that Monton and van Fraassen have not done enough to show that the context dependence of counterfactuals renders their truth conditions non-objective, and I also argue that adopting modal realism does after all undermine the motivation for constructive empiricism.
- Introduction
- Underdetermination and epistemic modesty
- Counterfactual observations
- Modal realism and constructive empiricism
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