Skip Navigation

The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 2005 56(1):101-116; doi:10.1093/phisci/axi105
This Article
Right arrow Full Text (PDF)
Right arrow Alert me when this article is cited
Right arrow Alert me if a correction is posted
Services
Right arrow Email this article to a friend
Right arrow Similar articles in this journal
Right arrow Alert me to new issues of the journal
Right arrow Add to My Personal Archive
Right arrow Download to citation manager
Right arrowRequest Permissions
Google Scholar
Right arrow Articles by Huber, F.
Right arrow Search for Related Content
Social Bookmarking
Add to CiteULike   Add to Connotea   Add to Del.icio.us  
What's this?

© The Author (2005). Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of British Society for the Philosophy of Science. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please email: journals.permissions@oupjournals.org

Subjective Probabilities as Basis for Scientific Reasoning?

Franz Huber

Philosophy, Probability, and Modeling Research Group, Center for Junior Research Fellows, PO Box M682, University of Konstanz, D–78457 Konstanz, Germany, franz.huber{at}uni-konstanz.de

Bayesianism is the position that scientific reasoning is probabilistic and that probabilities are adequately interpreted as an agent's actual subjective degrees of belief, measured by her betting behaviour. Confirmation is one important aspect of scientific reasoning. The thesis of this paper is the following: if scientific reasoning is at all probabilistic, the subjective interpretation has to be given up in order to get right confirmation—and thus scientific reasoning in general.

  1. The Bayesian approach to scientific reasoning
  2. Bayesian confirmation theory
  3. The example
  4. The less reliable the source of information, the higher the degree of Bayesian confirmation
  5. Measure sensitivity
  6. A more general version of the problem of old evidence
  7. Conditioning on the entailment relation
  8. The counterfactual strategy
  9. Generalizing the counterfactual strategy
  10. The desired result, and a necessary and sufficient condition for it
  11. Actual degrees of belief
  12. The common knock-down feature, or ‘anything goes’
  13. The problem of prior probabilities


Add to CiteULike CiteULike   Add to Connotea Connotea   Add to Del.icio.us Del.icio.us    What's this?


This article has been cited by other articles:


Home page
 Br J Philos SciHome page
F. Huber
Reply to Crupi et al.'s 'Bayesian Confirmation by Uncertain Evidence' ([2008])
Brit J Philos Sci, June 1, 2008; 59(2): 213 - 215.
[Full Text] [PDF]

Home page
 Br J Philos SciHome page
V. Crupi, R. Festa, and T. Mastropasqua
Bayesian Confirmation by Uncertain Evidence: A Reply to Huber [2005]
Brit J Philos Sci, June 1, 2008; 59(2): 201 - 211.
[Abstract] [Full Text] [PDF]


Disclaimer:
Please note that abstracts for content published before 1996 were created through digital scanning and may therefore not exactly replicate the text of the original print issues. All efforts have been made to ensure accuracy, but the Publisher will not be held responsible for any remaining inaccuracies. If you require any further clarification, please contact our Customer Services Department.