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The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 2005 56(1):27-59; doi:10.1093/phisci/axi102
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© The Author (2005). Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of British Society for the Philosophy of Science. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please email: journals.permissions@oupjournals.org

Causal Powers

Eric Hiddleston

Department of Philosophy, 541 Hall of Languages, Syracuse University, Syracuse, NY 13210, USA, edhiddle{at}syr.edu

Nancy Cartwright offers an account of causal powers, and argues that it explains some important general features of scientific method. Patricia Cheng argues that this theory is superior as a psychological theory of learning to standard models of conditioning. I extend and develop the theory, and argue that it provides the best explanation of a number of problem cases for philosophical theories of causation, including preemption, overdetermination and puzzles about transitivity.

  1. Hitchcock and Halpern & Pearl on ‘actual causes’
  2. Problems and morals
    2.1 Puzzles about prevention
    2.2 Counterfactuals

  3. Causal powers
    3.1 Generative causal power
    3.2 Preventative causal power

  4. Net and component powers
  5. ‘Actual’ or ‘successful’ causes
  6. Solutions to puzzle cases
  7. Conclusion


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C. Hitchcock
Prevention, Preemption, and the Principle of Sufficient Reason
Philosophical Review, October 1, 2007; 116(4): 495 - 532.
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