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The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science Advance Access originally published online on May 16, 2005
The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 2005 56(2):293-302; doi:10.1093/bjps/axi117
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© The Author (2005). Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of British Society for the Philosophy of Science. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please email: journals.permissions@oupjournals.org

Articles

Bayesian Confirmation and Auxiliary Hypotheses Revisited: A Reply to Strevens

Branden Fitelson and Andrew Waterman

Department of Philosophy, University of California, Berkeley, CA 94720–2390, USA, branden{at}fitelson.org; andrew.waterman{at}stanford.edu

Michael Strevens ([2001]) has proposed an interesting and novel Bayesian analysis of the Quine-Duhem (Q–D) problem (i.e., the problem of auxiliary hypotheses). Strevens's analysis involves the use of a simplifying idealization concerning the original Q–D problem. We will show that this idealization is far stronger than it might appear. Indeed, we argue that Strevens's idealization oversimplifies the Q–D problem, and we propose a diagnosis of the source(s) of the oversimplification.

  1. Some background on Quine–Duhem
  2. Strevens's simplifying idealization
  3. Indications that (I) oversimplifies Q–D
  4. Strevens's argument for the legitimacy of (I)


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This article has been cited by other articles:


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 Br J Philos SciHome page
B. Fitelson and A. Waterman
Comparative Bayesian Confirmation and the Quine-Duhem Problem: A Rejoinder to Strevens
Brit J Philos Sci, June 1, 2007; 58(2): 333 - 338.
[Abstract] [Full Text] [PDF]

Home page
 Br J Philos SciHome page
M. Strevens
The Bayesian Treatment of Auxiliary Hypotheses: Reply to Fitelson and Waterman
Brit J Philos Sci, December 1, 2005; 56(4): 913 - 918.
[Abstract] [Full Text] [PDF]


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