The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science Advance Access originally published online on May 16, 2005
The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 2005 56(2):335-361; doi:10.1093/bjps/axi120
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Articles |
Consciousness and Reduction
Department of Philosophy, University of Western Ontario, London, Ontario N6A 3K7, Canada, amarras{at}uwo.ca
A number of philosophers—among them Joseph Levine, David Chalmers, Frank Jackson and Jaegwon Kim—have claimed that there are conceptual grounds sufficient for ruling out the possibility of a reductive explanation of phenomenal consciousness. Their claim assumes a functional model of reduction (regarded by Kim as an alternative to the traditional Nagelian model) which requires an a priori entailment from the facts in the reduction base to the phenomena to be explained. The aim of this paper is to show that this is an unreasonable requirement—a requirement that no reductive explanation in science should be expected to satisfy. I argue that the functional model is not substantively different from the Nagelian model properly understood, and that the question whether consciousness is reductively explainable—in a sense involving property identifications or in some weaker sense compatible with Nagelian reduction—is a fundamentally empirical question, not one that can be settled on conceptual grounds alone.
- Introduction
- Kim's critique of the Nagelian model of reduction
- The functional model of reduction
- Is consciousness reducible?
- Psychophysical reduction: concluding remarks