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The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science Advance Access originally published online on August 10, 2005
The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 2005 56(3):611-613; doi:10.1093/bjps/axi134
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© The Author (2005). Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of British Society for the Philosophy of Science. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please email: journals.permissions@oupjournals.org

Truth and Provability—A Comment on Redhead

Panu Raatikainen

Department of Philosophy P.O. Box 9 FIN-00014 University of Helsinki Finland panu.raatikainen{at}helsinki.fi

Michael Redhead's recent argument aiming to show that humanly certifiable truth outruns provability is critically evaluated. It is argued that the argument is at odds with logical facts and fails.


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