Skip Navigation


The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science Advance Access originally published online on January 23, 2006
The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 2006 57(1):167-196; doi:10.1093/bjps/axi153
This Article
Right arrow Full Text
Right arrow Full Text (PDF)
Right arrow All Versions of this Article:
57/1/167    most recent
axi153v1
Right arrow Alert me when this article is cited
Right arrow Alert me if a correction is posted
Services
Right arrow Email this article to a friend
Right arrow Similar articles in this journal
Right arrow Similar articles in ISI Web of Science
Right arrow Alert me to new issues of the journal
Right arrow Add to My Personal Archive
Right arrow Download to citation manager
Right arrow Search for citing articles in:
ISI Web of Science (3)
Right arrowRequest Permissions
Google Scholar
Right arrow Articles by van Eck, D.
Right arrow Articles by Schouten, M. K. D.
Right arrow Search for Related Content
Social Bookmarking
Add to CiteULike   Add to Connotea   Add to Del.icio.us  
What's this?

© The Author (2006). Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of British Society for the Philosophy of Science. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please email: journals.permissions@oxfordjournals.org

Evaluating New Wave Reductionism: The Case of Vision

Dingmar van Eck and Huib Looren De Jong

Vrije Universiteit, Department Of Psychology, Van Der Boechorststraat 1, 1081 BT Amsterdam, The Netherlands h.looren.de.jong{at}psy.vu.nl

Maurice K. D. Schouten

Faculty Of Philosophy, Tilburg University, P.O. Box 90153, 5000 LE Tilburg, The Netherlands m.k.d.schouten{at}uvt.nl

This paper inquires into the nature of intertheoretic relations between psychology and neuroscience. This relationship has been characterized by some as one in which psychological explanations eventually will fall away as otiose, overthrown completely by neurobiological ones. Against this view it will be argued that it squares poorly with scientific practices and empirical developments in the cognitive neurosciences. We analyse a case from research on visual perception, which suggests a much more subtle and complex interplay between psychology and neuroscience than a complete take-over of the former by the latter. In the case of vision, cross-theory influences between psychology and neuroscience go back and forth, resulting in refinement in both disciplines.

We interpret this case study as showing that:

(1) Mutual co-evolution of psychological and neurobiological theories, exemplifying persisting top-down influences from psychology, is a more empirically adequate way to describe psychoneural theory relations than a view on co-evolution, favoured by reductionists, which regards the cross-theory contributions from psychology as merely heuristically useful with no enduring influence on neurobiological theorizing;

(2) In research on vision, discovering (or hypothesizing) the neural basis of functions vindicates psychological approaches, it does not eliminate them;

(3) Current work on vision shows that many perceptual phenomena must be understood in terms of dynamical interactions between an observer and his/her environment. Therefore, we argue that internalist characterizations of the visual system must be supplemented with externalist accounts that address these reciprocal observer-environment interactions involved in vision. Such processes seem quite different from (internal) cellular and molecular ones, and as such seem to lie outside the scope of neuroscientific inquiry. We conclude that psychoneural reduction or elimination is implausible as a meta-theoretical prediction of theory choice in empirical work. Instead, this case study of vision shows that both psychology and neuroscience contribute to, and complement one another in the study of visual perception.

  1. Psychoneural reductionism
    1.1 Introduction
    1.2 New Wave Reductionism
    1.3 NWR and psychology: three characteristics of psychoneural reductionism
    1.4 NWR and the problem of mutual feedback
    1.4.1 The ‘Mere Heuristics’ claim
    1.4.2 The disappearance of psychology as an irrelevant historical accident

    1.5 Summary: three claims of NWR on psychoneural reduction

  2. Vision: a case study
    2.1 Introduction
    2.1.1 Three opposing claims
    2.1.2 Psychology and neuroscience of vision: the orthodoxy

    2.2 Testing claim 1: vanishing heuristics or persisting influences?
    2.2.1 From what and where to perception and action
    2.2.2 Real co-evolution: more than vanishing heuristics
    2.2.3 First moral

    2.3 Testing claim 2: replacement or vindication?
    2.3.1 Perception and action revisited: mapping approaches on systems
    2.3.2 Vindicating psychological approaches
    2.3.3 Second moral

    2.4 Testing claim 3: equipotent image or explanatory loss?
    2.4.1 Perception and action extended: including the environment
    2.4.2 Distinguishing levels, widening explanations
    2.4.3 Third moral


  3. Conclusion: three morals


Add to CiteULike CiteULike   Add to Connotea Connotea   Add to Del.icio.us Del.icio.us    What's this?


This article has been cited by other articles:


Home page
 Theory PsychologyHome page
E. LaRock
Disambiguation, Binding, and the Unity of Visual Consciousness
Theory Psychology, December 1, 2007; 17(6): 747 - 777.
[Abstract] [PDF]


Disclaimer: Please note that abstracts for content published before 1996 were created through digital scanning and may therefore not exactly replicate the text of the original print issues. All efforts have been made to ensure accuracy, but the Publisher will not be held responsible for any remaining inaccuracies. If you require any further clarification, please contact our Customer Services Department.