The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science Advance Access originally published online on January 23, 2006
The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 2006 57(1):219-231; doi:10.1093/bjps/axi154
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Comment On Hausman & Woodward On The Causal Markov Condition
Department of Philosophy, 503 S. Kedzie Hall, Michigan State University, East Lansing, MI 48824-1032 steel{at}msu.edu
Hausman & Woodward present an argument for the Causal Markov Condition (CMC) on the basis of a principle they dub modularity ([1999, 2004]). I show that the conclusion of their argument is not in fact the CMC but a substantially weaker proposition. In addition, I show that their argument is invalid and trace this invalidity to two features of modularity, namely, that it is stated in terms of pairwise independence and arrow-breaking interventions. Hausman & Woodward's argument can be rendered valid through a reformulation of modularity, but it is doubtful that the argument so revised provides any substantially new insight regarding the basis of the CMC.
- Introduction
- The CMC versus Hausman & Woodward's conclusion
- Hausman & Woodward's argument
- Modularity and independent error terms
- Conclusion
- Appendix: D-separation