The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science Advance Access originally published online on December 22, 2005
The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 2006 57(1):93-119; doi:10.1093/bjps/axi151
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Causation: An Alternative
Fachbereich Philosophie, Universität Konstanz, 78457 Konstanz, Germany wolfgang.spohn{at}uni-konstanz.de
The paper builds on the basically Humean idea that A is a cause of B iff A and B both occur, A precedes B, and A raises the metaphysical or epistemic status of B given the obtaining circumstances. It argues that in pursuit of a theory of deterministic causation this status raising is best explicated not in regularity or counterfactual terms, but in terms of ranking functions. On this basis, it constructs a rigorous theory of deterministic causation that successfully deals with cases of overdetermination and pre-emption. It finally indicates how the account's profound epistemic relativization induced by ranking theory can be undone.
- Introduction
- Variables, propositions, time
- Induction first
- Causation
- Redundant causation
- Objectivization