The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science Advance Access originally published online on March 30, 2006
The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 2006 57(2):309-321; doi:10.1093/bjps/axl004
| ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
Accommodation and Prediction: The Case of the Persistent Head
Department of Philosophy, 1421 University Hall 601, South Morgan Street University of Illinois at Chicago, Chicago, IL 60607-7114 dharke1{at}uic.edu
A not unpopular thesis, when it comes to the confirmation of scientific theories, is that data which were used in the construction of a theory afford poorer support for that theory than data that played no role. Some compelling thought experiments have been offered in favour of this view, not as proof but rather to add some intuitive plausibility. In this paper I consider such thought experiments and argue that they do not support the thesis; the perceived importance of prediction over accommodation, at least in these cases, is illusory.
- Introduction
- Background assumptions
- Strong thesis
- Weak thesis
- Conclusions
![]()
CiteULike
Connotea
Del.icio.us What's this?
This article has been cited by other articles:
![]() |
D. Harker On the Predilections for Predictions Brit J Philos Sci, September 1, 2008; 59(3): 429 - 453. [Abstract] [Full Text] [PDF] |
||||
