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The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science Advance Access originally published online on November 14, 2006
The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 2006 57(4):691-707; doi:10.1093/bjps/axl024
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© The Author (2006). Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of British Society for the Philosophy of Science. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please email: journals.permissions@oxfordjournals.org

On Higher-Order and Free-Floating Chances

Justin C. Fisher

Department of Philosophy University of Arizona Box 210027 Tucson, AZ 85721 USA jcfisher{at}u.arizona.edu


  Abstract

Marc Lange ([2006]) considers what I call free-floating chances—objective chances that obtain at a given time despite the fact that their values are not determined by the laws of nature together with the full history of non-chancy facts up to that time. I offer an intuitive example of this phenomenon, and use it to argue that free-floating chances are indeed possible. Their possibility violates three quite widely held principles about chances: the lawful magnitude principle, the principle that chances evolve by conditionalization and a version of David Lewis' principal principle. I argue that we should reject common formulations of each of these principles, though I offer revised understandings of each which retain much of the intuitive attractiveness of the originals and are consistent with the possibility of free-floating chances. I conclude by arguing that, while considerations of free-floating chances are important, they will not sustain the extravagant conclusions Lange attempts to draw from them.

  1. Introduction
  2. First- and Higher-Order Chances
  3. Free-Floating Chances
  4. Support for the Intuitive Assessment
  5. Three Principles Violated
  6. What to do?
  7. COND as a Default Hypothesis
  8. A More Principled Principal Principle
  9. Conclusion


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