Skip Navigation


The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science Advance Access originally published online on May 18, 2007
The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 2007 58(2):113-140; doi:10.1093/bjps/axm002
This Article
Right arrow Full Text
Right arrow Full Text (PDF)
Right arrow All Versions of this Article:
58/2/113    most recent
axm002v1
Right arrow Alert me when this article is cited
Right arrow Alert me if a correction is posted
Services
Right arrow Email this article to a friend
Right arrow Similar articles in this journal
Right arrow Similar articles in ISI Web of Science
Right arrow Alert me to new issues of the journal
Right arrow Add to My Personal Archive
Right arrow Download to citation manager
Right arrowRequest Permissions
Google Scholar
Right arrow Articles by Schaffer, J.
Right arrow Search for Related Content
Social Bookmarking
Add to CiteULike   Add to Connotea   Add to Del.icio.us  
What's this?

Copyright © The Author 2007. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of British Society for the Philosophy of Science.

Deterministic Chance?

Jonathan Schaffer

Department of Philosophy, University of Massachusetts-Amherst, 352 Bartlett Hall, Amherst, MA 01060, USA


  Abstract

Can there be deterministic chance? That is, can there be objective chance values other than 0 or 1, in a deterministic world? I will argue that the answer is no. In a deterministic world, the only function that can play the role of chance is one that outputs just 0s and 1s. The role of chance involves connections from chance to credence, possibility, time, intrinsicness, lawhood, and causation. These connections do not allow for deterministic chance.

1 Overview
2 Four Arguments for Deterministic Chance
3 Four Conceptions of Deterministic Chance
4 The Role of Chance
5 The Case against Posterior Deterministic Chance
6 The Case against Initial Deterministic Chance
7 Epistemic Chance


Add to CiteULike CiteULike   Add to Connotea Connotea   Add to Del.icio.us Del.icio.us    What's this?




Disclaimer:
Please note that abstracts for content published before 1996 were created through digital scanning and may therefore not exactly replicate the text of the original print issues. All efforts have been made to ensure accuracy, but the Publisher will not be held responsible for any remaining inaccuracies. If you require any further clarification, please contact our Customer Services Department.