The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science Advance Access originally published online on May 18, 2007
The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 2007 58(2):299-329; doi:10.1093/bjps/axm015
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Sudden Infant Death or Murder? A Royal Confusion About Probabilities
Department of Philosophy, Lingnan University, Hong Kong
sesardic{at}ln.edu.hk
| Abstract |
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In this article I criticize the recommendations of some prominent statisticians about how to estimate and compare probabilities of the repeated sudden infant death and repeated murder. The issue has drawn considerable public attention in connection with several recent court cases in the UK. I try to show that when the three components of the Bayesian inference are carefully analyzed in this context, the advice of the statisticians turns out to be problematic in each of the steps.
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Setting the Stage: Bayes's Theorem
- 3 Prior Probabilities of Single SIDS and Single Homicide
- 4 Prior Probabilities of the Recurrence of SIDS and Homicide
- 5 Likelihoods of Double SIDS and Double Homicide
- 6 Posterior Probabilities of Double SIDS and Double Homicide
- 7 Conclusion
- 2 Setting the Stage: Bayes's Theorem