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The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science Advance Access originally published online on April 30, 2007
The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 2007 58(2):331-332; doi:10.1093/bjps/axm006
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Copyright © The Author 2007. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of British Society for the Philosophy of Science.

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John Lucas and Michael Redhead

Merton College, Oxford, UK
Centre for Philosophy of Natural and Social Science, The London School of Economics and Political Science, Houghton Street, London WC2A 2AE, UK

john.lucas{at}merton.oxford.ac.uk

mlr1000{at}hermes.cam.ac.uk


  Abstract

The views of Redhead ([2004]) are defended against the argument by Panu Raatikainen ([2005]). The importance of informal rigour is canvassed, and the argument for the a priori nature of induction is explained. The significance of Gödel's theorem is again rehearsed.


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