The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science Advance Access originally published online on May 16, 2007
The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 2007 58(2):333-338; doi:10.1093/bjps/axm012
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Comparative Bayesian Confirmation and the QuineDuhem Problem: A Rejoinder to Strevens
Philosophy Department, University of California-Berkeley
Independent Scholar
branden{at}fitelson.org
awaterman{at}stanfordalumni.org
| Abstract |
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By and large, we think (Strevens's [2005]) is a useful reply to our original critique (Fitelson and Waterman [2005]) of his article on the QuineDuhem (QD) problem (Strevens [2001]). But, we remain unsatisfied with several aspects of his reply (and his original article). Ultimately, we do not think he properly addresses our most important worries. In this brief rejoinder, we explain our remaining worries, and we issue a revised challenge for Strevens's approach to QD.
- 1 Strevens's clarifications
- 2 Strevens's new-and-improved negligibility arguments
- 2 Strevens's new-and-improved negligibility arguments