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The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science Advance Access originally published online on May 16, 2007
The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 2007 58(2):365-377; doi:10.1093/bjps/axm014
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Copyright © The Author 2007. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of British Society for the Philosophy of Science.

K. CODELL CARTER

The Rise of Causal Concepts of Disease. Case Histories

Ashgate, 2003.

ISBN 0 7546 0678 3

Donald Gillies

Department of Science and Technology Studies, University College London


  Abstract

1 Introduction
2 Causality in 19th and Early 20th Century Medicine
3 A Lakatosian Approach to the History of Medicine


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Introduction
Social Science History, September 1, 2009; 33(3): 293 - 305.
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