The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science Advance Access originally published online on July 31, 2007
The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 2007 58(3):387-408; doi:10.1093/bjps/axm028
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Reconstruction of Quantum Theory
CEA-Saclay, SPEC/LARSIM, 91191 Gif-sur-Yvette Cedex, France
alexei.grinbaum{at}cea.fr
| Abstract |
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What belongs to quantum theory is no more than what is needed for its derivation. Keeping to this maxim, we record a paradigmatic shift in the foundations of quantum mechanics, where the focus has recently moved from interpreting to reconstructing quantum theory. Several historic and contemporary reconstructions are analyzed, including the work of Hardy, Rovelli, and Clifton, Bub and Halvorson. We conclude by discussing the importance of a novel concept of intentionally incomplete reconstruction.
- 1 What is Wrong with Interpreting Quantum Mechanics
- 2 Reconstruction of Physical Theory
- 2.1 Schema
- 2.2 Selection of the first principles
- 2.3 Status of the first principles
- 2.2 Selection of the first principles
- 3 Examples of Reconstruction
- 3.1 Early examples of reconstruction
- 3.2 Hardy's reconstruction
- 3.3 Rovelli's reconstruction
- 3.4 The CBH reconstruction
- 3.5 Intentionally incomplete reconstructions
- 3.2 Hardy's reconstruction
- 4 Conclusion
- 2 Reconstruction of Physical Theory