The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science Advance Access originally published online on June 5, 2007
The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 2007 58(3):605-612; doi:10.1093/bjps/axm020
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Constructive Empiricism and the Metaphysics of Modality
Department of History and Philosophy of Science, University of Cambridge, Free School Lane, Cambridge CB2 3RH, UK
ped21{at}cam.ac.uk
| Abstract |
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James Ladyman ([2000]) argues that constructive empiricism is untenable because it cannot adequately account for modal statements about observability. In this paper, I attempt to resist Ladyman's conclusion, arguing that the constructive empiricist can grant his modal discourse objective, theory-independent truth-conditions, yet without compromising his empiricism.
- 1 Ladyman's dilemma
- 2 Constructive empiricism and modal agnosticism
- 3 Conclusion
- 2 Constructive empiricism and modal agnosticism
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