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The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 2008 59(2):201-211; doi:10.1093/bjps/axn008
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© The Author (2008). Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of British Society for the Philosophy of Science. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please email: journals.permissions@oxfordjournals.org

Bayesian Confirmation by Uncertain Evidence: A Reply to Huber [2005]

Vincenzo Crupi, Roberto Festa and Tommaso Mastropasqua

Department of Arts and Design, University IUAV of Venice, Dorsoduro 2206 30123 Venice, Italy, crupi{at}iuav.it
Department of Philosophy, University of Trieste, Androna Campo Marzio 10 34123 Trieste, Italy, festa{at}units.it
CIMeC, University of Trento, Palazzo Fedrigotti Corso Bettini 31 38068 Rovereto (TN), Italy, tommaso.mastropasqua{at}unitn.it


  Abstract

Bayesian epistemology postulates a probabilistic analysis of many sorts of ordinary and scientific reasoning. Huber ([2005]) has provided a novel criticism of Bayesianism, whose core argument involves a challenging issue: confirmation by uncertain evidence. In this paper, we argue that under a properly defined Bayesian account of confirmation by uncertain evidence, Huber's criticism fails. By contrast, our discussion will highlight what we take as some new and appealing features of Bayesian confirmation theory.

  1. Introduction
  2. Uncertain Evidence and Bayesian Confirmation
  3. Bayesian Confirmation by Uncertain Evidence: Test Cases and Basic Principles


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