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The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science Advance Access originally published online on July 7, 2008
The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 2008 59(3):391-407; doi:10.1093/bjps/axn013
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© The Author (2008). Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of British Society for the Philosophy of Science. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please email: journals.permissions@oxfordjournals.org

Why the Parts of Absolute Space are Immobile

Nick Huggett

Department of Philosophy, M/C 267 1413 University Hall University of Illinois at Chicago Chicago, IL 60607


  Abstract

Newton's arguments for the immobility of the parts of absolute space have been claimed to licence several proposals concerning his metaphysics. This paper clarifies Newton, first distinguishing two distinct arguments. Then, it demonstrates, contrary to Nerlich ([2005]), that Newton does not appeal to the identity of indiscernibles, but rather to a view about de re representation. Additionally, DiSalle ([1994]) claims that one argument shows Newton to be an anti-substantivalist. I agree that its premises imply a denial of a kind of substantivalism, but I show that they are inconsistent with Newton's core doctrine that not all motion is the relative motions of bodies, and so conclude that they are not part of his considered views on space.

  1. The Arguments
  2. The Identity Argument
    2.1 Identity of indiscernibles for individuals
    2.2 Identity of indiscernibles for worlds and states
    2.3 Representation de re

  3. Kinematic Relationism
  4. Conclusion


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