The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science Advance Access originally published online on January 16, 2009
The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 2009 60(1):79-100; doi:10.1093/bjps/axn048
| ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
Focused Correlation and Confirmation
Artificial Intelligence Center-CENTRIA, Department of Computer Science, Universidade Nova de Lisboa, 2829-516 Caparica, Portugal
grw{at}fct.unl.pt
| Abstract |
|---|
This essay presents results about a deviation from independence measure called focused correlation. This measure explicates the formal relationship between probabilistic dependence of an evidence set and the incremental confirmation of a hypothesis, resolves a basic question underlying Peter Klein and Ted Warfield's truth-conduciveness problem for Bayesian coherentism, and provides a qualified rebuttal to Erik Olsson's claim that there is no informative link between correlation and confirmation. The generality of the result is compared to recent programs in Bayesian epistemology that attempt to link correlation and confirmation by utilizing a conditional evidential independence condition. Several properties of focused correlation are also highlighted.
- Introduction
- Correlation Measures
- 2.1 Standard covariance and correlation measures
- 2.2 The Wayne–Shogenji measure
- 2.3 Interpreting correlation measures
- 2.4 Correlation and evidential independence
- 2.2 The Wayne–Shogenji measure
- 2.1 Standard covariance and correlation measures
- Focused Correlation
- Conclusion
Appendix