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The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 2009 60(3):459-474; doi:10.1093/bjps/axp029
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© The Author (2009). Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of British Society for the Philosophy of Science. All rights reserved. For permissions, please email: journals.permissions@oxfordjournals.org

‘The Most Sacred Tenet’? Causal Reasoning in Physics

Mathias Frisch

University of Maryland, College Park mfrisch{at}umd.edu


  Abstract

According to a view widely held among philosophers of science, the notion of cause has no legitimate role to play in mature theories of physics. In this paper I investigate the role of what physicists themselves identify as causal principles in the derivation of dispersion relations. I argue that this case study constitutes a counterexample to the popular view and that causal principles can function as genuine factual constraints.

  1. Introduction
  2. Causality and Dispersion Relations
  3. Norton's Skepticism
  4. Conclusion


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This article has been cited by other articles:


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 Br J Philos SciHome page
J. D. Norton
Is There an Independent Principle of Causality in Physics?
Brit J Philos Sci, September 1, 2009; 60(3): 475 - 486.
[Abstract] [Full Text] [PDF]

Home page
 Br J Philos SciHome page
M. Frisch
Causality and Dispersion: A Reply to John Norton
Brit J Philos Sci, September 1, 2009; 60(3): 487 - 495.
[Abstract] [Full Text] [PDF]


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